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<Book Review> 
Raymond Corbey, The 
Metaphysics of Apes. 
Negotiating the Animal- 
Human Boundary, 




The Metaphysics of Apes is a deconstructive book. 
What, exactly, does this survey of three “great ape 
debates”—around 1760, starting from the first encounters 
with the apes; around 1860, with reference to the 
discovery of apish ancestors; and after 1960, following 
the detection in the apes of behaviors which were 
previously considered uniquely human—and their 
aftermaths deconstruct? What is the aim of the critical 
examination of the conjectures about the state of nature 
and its inhabitants, of the post-Darwinian idea of an 
“ascent from the ape”, or of the peculiar philosophical 
connotations of the notion of “humanity” in most 
paleontology works?  
Corbey’s central contention is that the discovery of 
ambiguous ape-like creatures was immediately perceived 
as a serious threat to the deeply cherished idea of human 
uniqueness; and that, in the face of such threat, the 
animal-human boundary—a boundary specifying what 
can be owned, killed, eaten, and what not—was not 
abandoned but relentlessly policed and redrawn. 
Subjecting to close scrutiny disciplines like biology, 
natural history, anthropology and primatology, Corbey 
highlights how the metaphysical commitment to the idea 
of an animal/human dichotomy influenced not only their 
conceptualizations but even the articulation of their 
disciplinary identity. 
Seen in this perspective, Corbey’s book shows how 
easily in our cultural history we have tended to draw facts 
from values. The overcoming of the barrier between facts 
and values is usually stressed in relation to the opposite 
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course. In moral philosophy there is a name for what 
forbids such an overcoming—“Hume’s Law”1. The basic 
idea is that, since the realm of what is is logically distinct 
from the realm of what ought to be, one cannot deduce 
prescriptive conclusions from descriptive premises. In 
this version, such logical point is today accepted by most 
moral philosophers. Obviously, however, once accepted, 
it holds as well in its contrary enunciation, according to 
which one cannot deduce descriptive conclusions from 
prescriptive premises. In this version too, the point is 
accepted by the majority of those who are interested in 
it—namely, not the philosophers but the scientists. All the 
more so: the most ingrained scientific apologetics always 
aimed at representing science as a value free enterprise. 
That this representation doesn’t always fit reality 
has been repeatedly alleged. What Corbey underlines, 
however, is a more radical phenomenon. In brief, what is 
in question is a guiding-function of values so decisive as 
to almost programmatically distort the facts. The values 
are those inherited from the traditional European 
metaphysical vision—the normative notions of human 
uniqueness, of a hierarchical order of beings, of a 
nature-culture divide—and the facts are those concerning 
the categorisation of the various apish beings 
progressively bursting in the North Atlantic cosmos. 
Corbey’s examples come from all the involved 
disciplines. In natural history, when Linnaeus classifies 
humans in the same genus as the Orang-Outang, authors 
like Buffon, Blumenbach and Camper are quick to 
reaffirm the traditional separation. In evolutionary 
biology, the idea of a long ascent towards humanity of 
our apelike ancestors has the function of preserving the 
concept of a hierarchy at whose apex are the members of 
our species. In paleoanthropology, the attribution of 
fossils to the genus Homo undergoes a reordering 
whenever hominitas, or being human in the biological 
sense, does not coincide with humanitas, or being human 
in the philosophical sense. In cultural anthropology, 
finally, the nature-culture theoretical duality shows 
through the claim of a radical autonomy from biological 
disciplines.  
An analogous process can be detected in the 
younger field of primatology. Initially experienced as a 
subdiscipline of physical anthropology, primatology, as 
soon as the relevance of its discoveries gave it an 
autonomous disciplinary identity, immediately called 
forth further defense mechanisms, causing a continual 
adjustment of the conventional marks of humanity. Thus, 
if chimpanzees use tools, the cleavage shifts to 
toolmaking; if chimpanzees make tools, the cleavage is 
the systematic making of tools of varied types; and if 
chimpanzees pass the mirror self-recognition test, this is 
not enough to reveal self-awareness in the absence of the 
capacity for making plans and for attributing mental 
states to others. (Useless to say, these capacities too were 






















The explicative power of Corbey’s deconstruction is 
apparent. Yet, at least two objections may come to mind. 
One is substantive, and concerns the dominant Western 
focus: aren’t there also different traditions, favoring 
different orientations? In fact, albeit synthetically, Corbey 
considers non-Western traditions. In this context, he not 
only underscores how Eastern cultures did not always 
postulate an insuperable boundary between humans and 
the other animals, but also emphasizes the originality of 
Japanese primatology, with its practice of naming 
individuals, stressing relationships and applying the 
Kyokan (“sympathetic”) method—a practice with respect 
to which he acknowledges the debt of scientists from all 
over the world.  
The second question concerns instead methodology: 
cannot such a critical approach risk to delegitimate the 
entire scientific enterprise? Well aware of this problem, 
Corbey does not evade epistemological problems. First, 
he admits that in his view, based on Hilary Putnam’s2 
“internal realism” —a sort of methodological third way 
between Popperian rationalism and Kuhnian 
irrationalism—what is tested against reality is never a 
single proposition, but always an entire theoretical 
assemblage, so that, in the absence of an absolute 
criterion transcending all theoretical activity, “reality” is 
always that of a specific discourse. But second, he 
stresses that two elements prevent any estreme form of 
relativism: the approach allows that every scheme might 
be criticized on the basis of important requirements such 
as internal consistency and praticability for specific 
purposes; and it entails that the empirical data, with their 
solid structure, dictate unambiguous answers to the 
questions that are formulated within the framework of 
each particular conceptual scheme.  
On the other hand, an important consequence of this 
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epistemological stance is that it makes possible a first 
challenge to the traditional dualistic paradigm that issues 
in dichotomies such as animal-human and nature-culture. 
That is to say, the deconstructive argument according to 
which both the general view of Darwinian evolution and 
the approach to the nonhuman primates are still policed 
by prescientific philosophical outlooks amounts to “a 
gambit, perhaps of a queen more than a pawn”—of a 
move, that is, which can actually make a difference, both 
philosophically and ethically.  
The reference to ethics leads us to a final aspect of 
The Metaphysics of Apes which deserves to be mentioned. 
While surveying the different elements to which the 
phrase “metaphysics of apes” may refer, Corbey wonders 
whether in his work, as compared to the room devoted to 
the first three—the status granted to the apes, the 
convictions guiding their classification, and the 
perspective at work in the ways they are 
conceptualized—the fourth, that is, the way in which the 
apes themselves see the world, may not have been dealt 
with merely in an indirect manner, through the analysis of 
the various human construals of their subjectivities. Not 
so. For the appearance of ethics evokes a radical sense in 
which the apes’ very perception of the world is included 
in the book. 
In a chapter devoted to a survey of the results of the 
current scientific investigation on the great apes, after 
illustrating the evidences of the complexity of their social 
life and of the extent of their cognitive capacities, Corbey 
turns his attention to the recent movement to grant 
fundamental legal rights to these close evolutionary 
relatives of ours. In doing so, he does not confine himself 
to describing an ongoing social process, but also refers to 
an initiative, the Great Ape Project3, in which he has 
personally participated, subscribing, together with such 
scholars as Toshisada Nishida, Takayoshi Kano, Jane 
Goodall and Richard Dawkins, the demand for a first 
extension of basic equality to chimpanzees, gorillas and 
orang-utans.  
What this move amounts to is an epistemic and 
normative assumption of the perspective of these beings 
at its most basic level, concerning the intentional 
relationship which, as agents, they have with their goals 
and with the means by which to pursue them—a 
relationship that can be substantiated only insofar as they 
are not deprived of their life, well-being and freedom. 
With this ethical gesture, and with this anti-dualist choice, 
Corbey picks up all the threads of his discourse. For in 
this way the great apes, once redeemed from the 
condition to which they are now relegated, may become 
the much sought-after missing links in a new and more 
positive key: “[Not] primarily as evolutionary links in an 
‘ascent’ to civilization, but as go-betweens and mediators 
between humans and other animals, philosophically, 
scientifically and morally”. 
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